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An Elegant Convergence?  
The Constitutional Entrenchment of 
‘Jurisdictional Error’ Review in Australia 
 
Simon Young* & Sarah Murray** 
 
 
In 2010 the Australian High Court overturned a state health and safety prosecution by means of a 
constitutional law advance not seen since the free speech cases and the Kable decision of the mid 1990s.  
Pursuant to this decision, Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW), the core supervisory jurisdiction of the Australian 
State Supreme Courts (over jurisdictional error) is now constitutionally protected against legislative ouster.  
In the ensuing rush of interest in this constitutional extension, the role and readiness of the other partner to 
the emerging public law collaboration – administrative law and its notoriously unsteady notion of 
‘jurisdictional error’ – has been somewhat neglected.  This article attempts to draw together the threads of 
the constitutional development behind Kirk, and then proceeds to reassess the increasingly pivotal notion of 
jurisdictional error.  It examines the High Court’s recent forays into this administrative law conundrum, 
attempts to re-phrase the problem as a tension between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ approaches, and seeks to 
construct a solution. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The High Court decision in Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW)1 has quickly risen to 
prominence in professional and academic legal consciousness in Australia.  It is a 
decision that impacts at many levels and for that reason earns a place amongst the most 
significant Australian cases of the decade.  In basic terms the High Court overturned a 
state Industrial Court prosecution, in a manner that had some awkward immediate 
ramifications for the administration and ongoing development of occupational health and 
safety law (in New South Wales and nationally).2  The decision’s broader and longer 
term contribution is an ostensibly more elegant one, and it marks something of a tipping 
point in Australian legal development.  It also indicates that the current High Court is 
pursuing symmetry and coherency in Australian public law, building upon the 
distinctiveness of its underlying structures in a progressive and positive way.   
 
The critical component of Kirk was the manner in which the High Court3 (on appeal from 
the New South Wales Supreme Court4) side-lined a long-prominent feature of the New 
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reasoning in the joint judgment, but dissented as to orders (including as to costs). 
4
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South Wales legal landscape - a privative clause protecting its Industrial Court.5  This 
was achieved, in part, via a constitutional conclusion that the immutable ‘defining 
characteristics’ of a state Supreme Court included its power to confine inferior courts and 
tribunals within the limits of their authority by granting relief on the ground of 
jurisdictional error.6  The High Court determined that the privative clause did not (and 
could not validly) exclude that jurisdiction.7  As early Australian commentary has noted, 
the broad implications of this conclusion are profound; we find here an evolution and 
solidification in the state Supreme Courts’ constitutional personality (which has been 
applied and developed further in the recent High Court case of Wainohu v New South 
Wales8), and a notable advance in the collaboration between Australian constitutional 
and administrative law that came to particular prominence in migration decision of 
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth.9   
 
Despite the appealing simplicity of the reasoning in Kirk, a broader lens reveals that the 
case dips deeply into some important and difficult issues in both constitutional and 
administrative law.  In terms of the protected constitutional personality of the state 
Supreme Courts, Kirk is part of a recent tide of High Court cases (including South 
Australia v Totani,10 Hogan v Hinch11 and Wainohu12) which have significantly advanced 
the jurisprudence relating to Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution 
(Constitution).  Yet beyond the constitutional dimension there are a number of other 
issues that are yet to be fully explored.  The most important of these, given the precise 
point of public law intersection in Kirk, is the question of whether we are now any closer 
to a settled position on the elusive notion of ‘jurisdictional error’.  This concept has of 
course survived in Australia, despite its effective expiry elsewhere.13  It has remained 
important here in the handling of privative clauses generally; in assessments of the 
precise legal effect of error and the availability of particular judicial review remedies; and 
in the delimitation of the constitutionally-conferred original judicial review jurisdiction of 
the High Court.  Now it is heavily implicated in the design of an immutable jurisdiction for 
the state Supreme Courts.  It is fair to say, however, that as jurisdictional error’s star has 
continued to rise in Australia, so too has the quiet resignation that it is an intractably 
uncertain concept. 
 
The Kirk decision marks a return by the High Court to the more difficult end of the 
jurisdictional error confusion; it had for some years dealt largely with matters that 
allowed it to follow specific well-trodden precedential paths.  The importance of this 
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6
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however the High Court was clearly pursuing the larger question of whether States could effectively protect 
such errors – see further below and the discussion in Nick Gouliaditis, ‘Privative Clauses: Epic Fail’ (Gilbert & 
Tobin Centre for Public Law 2010 Constitutional Law Conference, Sydney, 19 February 2010) 6. 
7
  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, [54]ff. 
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return has been somewhat lost in the broader and grander implications of Kirk, and in 
the brevity of the High Court’s conclusions on the central administrative law issues.  Yet 
on close inspection those conclusions do reveal some ongoing conceptual tension, and 
indeed confirm the opaque and very contestable nature of the standard measures (the 
‘Craig formulas’14) employed by the courts in identifying jurisdictional error.  
Unfortunately attention has now returned, via some important migration cases,15 to the 
relatively more settled concept of ‘jurisdictional fact’.  And given the extremely politically-
charged nature of these cases, the professional and academic focus may remain there 
for sometime.  
 
Prominent among the supporters of the High Court’s decision in Kirk is the Chief Justice 
of New South Wales, who has expressed ‘unmitigated admiration’ for its contribution.16  
This may seem surprising, given Chief Justice Spigelman’s role in the overturned 
Supreme Court decision below, until it is recalled that his Honour has been entangled in 
a number of difficult decisions in this field of administrative law and hence no doubt sees 
the appeal of simplicity as an end in itself.  The New South Wales Chief Justice has also 
noted that his earlier prediction of ongoing constitutional ‘pull’ upon state administrative 
law17 has come to pass: ‘The gravitational force has done its work.  Newton’s apple is on 
the ground.’18  He has thus proceeded, writing extra judicially, to ‘pick [the apple] up, 
polish it a little and check it for worms’.19   
 
Spigelman CJ’s analogy is an engaging one, however the poetry recedes as we begin to 
examine the significant questions freshly disturbed.  Kirk is part 2 of an important 
contemporary administrative law story, and roughly part 8 of a constitutional one.  Both 
are unfinished, and the elegant convergence belies the complexity of the trajectories 
involved and the interesting fragility of the intersection.  This article first endeavours to 
draw together the threads of the relevant Australian constitutional law development and 
commentary, and then proceeds to probe its sharpening point of intersection with 
Australian administrative law – the concept of ‘jurisdictional error’.  Has this critical 
notion, having long tormented lawyers in Australia, matured sufficiently in the 
contemporary High Court jurisprudence to sustain its increasingly central role?  If it is still 
conspicuously lacking in clarity, is there a suitable path ahead?  An attempt is made 
here to distil a new explanation of one of the core conceptual tensions, to query the 
ongoing relevance of traditional Australian approaches, and to fully construct a new 
internally-focused statutory intention based methodology. 
 
The Constitutional Backdrop 
 
Despite the prominence and reasonably self-contained nature of Kirk’s constitutional 
conclusions, close examination reveals that they represent more an evolution of existing 
understandings than a new stream of authority.  It is a highly significant evolution given 
its impact upon state administrative law, however it is important to place the Kirk 
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decision in its proper constitutional law context so that its contribution can be clearly 
understood and further developed in a principled manner.    
 
Kirk’s Constitutional rationale 
 
The key constitutional aspect to Kirk is the recognition of the Australian state Supreme 
Courts’ indelible supervisory jurisdiction in respect of jurisdictional error.20  The joint 
judgment of French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ based this 
recognition on two initial premises.  First, their Honours asserted that s 73 of the 
Commonwealth Constitution21 requires the continuing existence of the Supreme Courts 
from which appeals can proceed to the High Court (subject to exceptions enacted by the 
Commonwealth Parliament).22  Second, they argued that a state Parliament lacks the 
power to ‘alter the constitution or character of its Supreme Court’ such that it loses the 
quality of being a ‘Supreme Court of a State’ as envisaged by Chapter III of the 
Constitution.23   
 
To these principles the Court added the critical idea that the ‘supervisory role of the 
Supreme Courts exercised through the grant of prohibition, certiorari and mandamus 
(and habeas corpus) was, and is, a defining characteristic of those courts’.24  This 
constitutionalisation of administrative law review at the state level represents a 
significant development on past authority.  The prevailing understanding appears for 
some time to have been that, although it was not easy in view of niggardly statutory 
interpretation principles, state parliaments could potentially screen jurisdictional error 
from judicial interference.  This was of course the central point in the pre-Kirk New South 
Wales decision of Mitchforce v Industrial Relations Commission25 (discussed below).  
And in the important High Court decision of Darling Casino, Gaudron and Gummow JJ 
prominently argued, in obiter, that a clear statutory intention could result in a state 
privative clause ‘preclud[ing] review for errors of any kind’ except the serious manifest 
errors identified in the old decision of Hickman.26  However, the majority in Kirk clearly 
pushed passed the narrow Hickman supervisory preserve, apparently on the basis that 
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  It provides: ‘The High Court shall have jurisdiction, with such exceptions and subject to such regulations as the  
Parliament prescribes, to hear and determine appeals from all judgments, decrees, orders, and sentences:  
(i) of any Justice or Justices exercising the original jurisdiction of the High Court;  
(ii) of any other federal court, or court exercising federal jurisdiction; or of the Supreme Court of any 
State, or of any other court of any State from which at the establishment of the Commonwealth an 
appeal lies to the Queen in Council;  
                     (iii)  of the Inter-State Commission, but as to questions of law only;  
and the judgment of the High Court in all such cases shall be final and conclusive….’.  
22
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discussed further below.)  For further commentary see: Denise Meyerson, ‘State and Federal Privative Clauses: 
Not So Different After All’ (2005) 16 Public Law Review 39, 43-44; Michael Sexton and Julia Quilter, ‘Privative 
Clauses and State Constitutions’ (2003) 5(4) Constitutional Law & Policy Review 69, 73, 74; Nick Gouliaditis, 
‘Privative Clauses: Epic Fail’ (Gilbert & Tobin Centre for Public Law 2010 Constitutional Law Conference, 
Sydney, 19 February 2010) 5. 
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the ‘constitutional significance of the supervisory jurisdiction of the State Supreme 
Courts’ requires jurisdictional error review at state level to be given the kind of 
constitutional protection which previously was assumed to be reserved for the High 
Court under s 75(v) of the Constitution.27 
 
The Kirk majority based this conclusion on the Constitution’s express use of the term 
‘Supreme Court of a State’ and the profile of such courts at the time of Federation.  The 
Supreme Courts of the colonies were noted to have inherited the relevant jurisdiction of 
the Court of Queen’s Bench, and the colonial Courts’ jurisdiction was said to extend to 
the power to grant the writ of certiorari even in the face of a privative clause.28  This, it 
was apparently thought, remained important to the constitutional notion of a Supreme 
Court post-federation, and the relevant jurisdiction remained ‘the mechanism for the 
determination and the enforcement of the limits on the exercise of State executive and 
judicial power by persons and bodies other than the Supreme Court’.29   
 
This constitutional explanation, based on the history of the state Supreme Court 
function, has not been wholeheartedly accepted.  Several commentators have noted the 
sparseness of the judicial authority cited to support the asserted centrality of the 
Supreme Courts’ supervisory jurisdiction,30 some particularly questioning the High 
Court’s heavy reliance on the early decision of Colonial Bank of Australasia v Willan.31  
While there is perhaps room for argument as regards some of the alternative readings of 
Willan,32 the concerns underline the fact that this 1874 decision, given the intervening 
years and developments, could only offer somewhat fragile support for this vital new 
legal principle.     
 
Perhaps with some anticipation of these concerns, the majority’s protection of the 
Supreme Courts’ supervisory jurisdiction was also supported by a strengthening 
emphasis upon the role of the Supreme Courts within Chapter III of the Constitution.  
With this new emphasis, labelled by some commentators as ‘policy’ flavoured,33 their 
Honours concluded that consequences flow from the fact that s 73 of the Constitution 
contemplates that the High Court will continue as an avenue of appeal from the state 
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  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, [100]. 
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  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, [96], [98]. 
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  Chris Finn, ‘Constitutionalising Supervisory Review at State Level: The End of Hickman?’ (2010) 21  
Public Law Review 92, 99; Nick Gouliaditis, ‘Privative Clauses: Epic Fail’ (Gilbert & Tobin Centre  
for Public Law 2010 Constitutional Law Conference, Sydney, 19 February 2010) 7; Leslie Zines, ‘Recent 
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31
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perhaps takes the Privy Council’s emphasis upon the term ‘manifest’ too far from the context in which it was 
used (and of course the notion of ‘jurisdictional error’ was in those times itself a narrower one).  Moreover, 
whilst it is fair to say that Willan does not expressly contradict the since dominant view that the Supreme Courts’ 
review jurisdiction rests entirely upon the interpretation of the interposed privative clause, it similarly does not 
offer much support to that view.  Ultimately it would seem that Willan was essentially a case about the 
reviewability of factual findings which were clearly within the province of the inferior court. 
33
  Chris Finn, ‘Constitutionalising Supervisory Review at State Level: The End of Hickman?’ (2010) 21  
Public Law Review 92, 100; Nick Gouliaditis, ‘Privative Clauses: Epic Fail’ (Gilbert & Tobin Centre  
for Public Law 2010 Constitutional Law Conference, Sydney, 19 February 2010) 7. 
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Supreme Courts.34  Ultimately, while the Commonwealth Parliament could introduce 
relevant ‘exceptions’ and ‘regulations’,35 it was said that state Parliaments are not able to 
interfere with this constitutionally referenced appellate channel.  Further, the majority felt 
that the stripping of the Supreme Courts’ jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs would 
create ‘islands of power immune from supervision and restraint’.36  This, it was felt, 
would compromise the existence of the ‘one common law of Australia’37 as well as the 
‘constitutional framework for the Australian judicial system’.38  This view emphasises that 
the constitutional effect of s 73 is that the High Court sits as the ultimate Australian 
appellate body across state and federal jurisdictions.  And, as asserted by Zines, if ‘the 
supervisory and appellate jurisdiction of state Supreme Courts can be reduced the 
position of the High Court at the apex of the state’s judicial system is also reduced’.39  In 
essence, the Court in Kirk took the view that without the entrenchment of these judicial 
review powers of the Supreme Courts, the Australian curial framework would not operate 
as the Constitution envisaged.40 
 
The Kable heritage  
 
The reasoning in Kirk resonates with some of the state constitutional law principles 
developed in the pioneering decision of Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions,41 
particularly in relation to the constitutional constraints which flow from the integrated 
Australian court system.42  In Kable, it was held that state courts played a part in the 
constitutional structure ‘beyond their status and role as part of the State judicial 
systems’.43  Even without a clear separation of powers at the state level, as s 77(iii) of 
the Constitution enabled Supreme Courts to act as repositories of federal judicial 
power,44 it was found that a conferral by the New South Wales Parliament of functions 
on its Supreme Court which resulted in loss of public confidence in that Court would 
thereby taint the operations of Chapter III of the Constitution. 
                                                 
34
  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, [98]. 
35
  Constitution, s 73 para 1, although cf para 3.  The requirement of special leave for an appeal to the  
High Court provides a good example of such a regulation, see: Carson v John Fairfax & Sons  
(1991) 173 CLR 194, 217.  
36
  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, [99]. 
37
  Ibid. See also Breavington v Godleman (1988) 169 CLR 41, 121 (Deane J); Lipohar v The Queen (1999) 200  
CLR 485, [45] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Leslie Zines, ‘Recent Developments  
in Chapter III: Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales & South Australia v Totani’ 
(CCCS/AACL Seminar, Melbourne Law School, Melbourne, 26 November 2010) 12. 
38
  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, [93].  
39
  Leslie Zines, ‘Recent Developments in Chapter III: Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of New  
South Wales & South Australia v Totani’ (CCCS/AACL Seminar, Melbourne Law School, Melbourne, 26 
November 2010) 12, 13. 
40
  See also Justice J Gilmour, ‘Kirk: Newton’s Apple Fell’ (2010 Conference of the Samuel Griffith Society, Perth,  
29 August 2010) 18. 
41
  Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (1996) 189 CLR 51 (‘Kable’).  This link is intimated by French CJ and ‘
 Kiefel J in the subsequent case of Wainohu (2011) 85 ALJR 746, [46]. For an early prediction of this  
line of reasoning based on Kable and s 73 of the Constitution see: Dan Meagher, ‘The Status of the Kable 
Principle in Australian Constitutional Law’ (2005) Public Law Review 182, 186. 
42
  See Leslie Zines, ‘Recent Developments in Chapter III: Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of New South 
Wales & South Australia v Totani’ (CCCS/AACL Seminar, Melbourne Law School, Melbourne, 26 November 
2010) 10.  
43
  Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51, 114 (McHugh J). 
44
  It provides that the Commonwealth ‘Parliament may make laws…. (iii) investing any court of a  
State with federal jurisdiction’. 
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This constitutional principle has evolved such that, while state courts are not to be 
equated constitutionally with federal courts, the capacity of such state courts to exercise 
federal jurisdiction requires that state parliaments cannot confer on these courts 
functions incompatible with their ‘institutional integrity’.45  However, even with this 
modification, for over a decade the High Court seemed loathe to reapply Kable.  In a 
long line of decisions including Fardon, Forge v Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission,46 Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Incorporated v Commissioner for Police47 
and K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court,48 the Court determined that the 
exceptional legislative circumstances of Kable were not replicated.  The constitutional 
wind changed however, in 2009, initially in the criminal confiscation case of International 
Finance Trust Co Ltd v New South Wales Crime Commission.49  Soon after, in Totani,50 
the High Court (by 6:1) activated the Kable principle in the context of the Serious and 
Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008 (SA) because of the substantial incompatibility of s 
14 of that Act (which pre-emptively required the Magistrates Court to make ‘control 
orders’) with that Court’s institutional integrity.  Even more recently, organised crime 
legislation was again invalidated by a similar 6:1 split across the High Court in Wainohu.  
The New South Wales legislation there conferred upon Supreme Court judges (as 
personae designatae) the administrative function of making declarations in relation to 
certain organisations - but imposed no obligation to give reasons, which the Court felt 
compromised the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court.51 
 
Kirk was handed down in the midst of these significant advances.  Interestingly, the 
judgments in Kirk did not refer directly to Kable and were not, as in Kable, focused on 
the continued effective investiture of federal judicial power in state courts.52  Kable did 
however feature extensively in argument before the High Court53 and Heydon J, in 
responding to counsels’ submissions, linked the Kirk context directly with Kable’s federal 
jurisdictional emphasis.54 
 
                                                 
45
  See eg, Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513, 534 (McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ); Fardon v 
Attorney-General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575 (‘Fardon’); International Finance Trust Co Ltd v New South Wales 
Crime Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319, 355 [56] (French CJ) (‘International Finance Trust’). 
46
  Forge (2006) 228 CLR 45. 
47
  Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Incorporated v Commissioner for Police (2008) 234 CLR 532  
(‘Gypsy Jokers’). 
48
  K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501 (‘K-Generation’). 
49
  International Finance Trust (2009) 240 CLR 319. 
50
  (2010) 85 ALJR 19. 
51
  Wainohu (2011) 85 ALJR 746, [69] (French CJ), [109] (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and  
Bell JJ). 
52
  Transcript of Proceedings, Kirk & Anor v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW & Anor [2009]  
HCATrans 239 (1 October 2009) (S McLeish SC). Cf the unsuccessful submission put to the New  
South Wales Court of Appeal in this regard in Mitchforce (2003) 57 NSWLR 212. 
53
  Transcript of Proceedings, Kirk & Anor v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW & Anor [2009] HCATrans 237 
(29 September 2009) (Mr G Hatcher SC); Transcript of Proceedings, Kirk & Anor v Industrial Relations 
Commission of NSW & Anor [2009] HCATrans 238 (30 September 2009) (Mr Hatcher); Transcript of 
Proceedings, Kirk & Anor v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW & Anor [2009] HCATrans 239 (1 October 
2009) (S Gageler SC); Transcript of Proceedings, Kirk & Anor v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW & 
Anor [2009] HCATrans 239 (1 October 2009) (S McLeish SC). 
54
  Heydon J questioned whether a Supreme Court ‘white anted’ of its powers of review and sidelined from 
involvement in most curial activity could remain an appropriate repository for federal judicial power: Transcript of 
Proceedings, Kirk & Anor v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW & Anor [2009] HCATrans 239 (1 October 
2009). 
 8 
In any case, there is multifaceted symmetry between Kirk and Kable; a symmetry which 
to some extent may have been obfuscated, in the interests of unanimity, in bringing 
together the 6 judge majority in Kirk.55  French CJ and Kiefel J appear to more clearly 
associate Kirk with Kable in their separate judgment in the recent Wainohu decision.56  
Acknowledging this symmetry makes sense for two reasons.  First, Kirk clearly draws on 
ideas which surfaced in the majority judgments in Kable.57  For example, in Kable 
McHugh J emphasised that s 73 of the Constitution and the constitutionally enshrined 
appellate structure prevented Supreme Courts from ceasing to exist at the state ‘apex’.58  
While his view has received some criticism,59 his Honour expressly linked this to the 
supervisory role of superior state courts in his obiter comments: 
 
a State law that prevented a right of appeal to the Supreme Court from, or a review of, a 
decision of an inferior State court, however described, would seem inconsistent with the 
principle expressed in s 73 and the integrated system of State and federal courts that 
covering cl 5 and Ch III envisages.
60
 
Similarly, Gummow J in Kable explained that the reference in s 73 to the states’ 
‘Supreme Court[s]’ would prevent the segregation of state courts ‘into a distinct and self-
contained stratum within the Australian judicature’61 as, constitutionally, they must 
remain the uppermost court in ‘the judicial hierarchy of the State’.62 
Recognition of the Kable – Kirk connection is also encouraged by the fact that in Kable 
Gummow J identified s 73’s mention of ‘Supreme Court[s]’ as a ‘constitutional 
expression’.63  Detailed analysis of the history of this tactic of using the constitutional text 
to ‘imbu[e]…constitutional provisions with new substantive content’64 is beyond the 
scope of this article.  However, certainly this approach has proven popular as regards 
the notion of a ‘Supreme Court’.  In Gypsy Jokers Crennan J indicated that state 
legislation cannot ‘alter the constitution or character of a Supreme Court of a State so as 
to impair its institutional integrity’ and ‘preclude that court from answering the 
constitutional description “Supreme Court of [a] State”’.65  And in Forge, Gummow, 
Hayne and Crennan JJ noted that Kable had affirmed that state Supreme Courts were a 
constitutional necessity66 and: 
 
Because Ch III requires that there be a body fitting the description “the Supreme Court of 
a State”, it is beyond the legislative power of a State so to alter the constitution or 
                                                 
55
  For a discussion of judicial minimalism in the US context see: Cass Sunstein, One Case at a Time  
– Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (1999) 11-14. 
56
  Wainohu (2011) 85 ALJR 746, [44]-[46]. 
57
  Transcript of Proceedings, Kirk & Anor v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW & Anor [2009] HCATrans 237 
(29 September 2009) (Mr G Hatcher SC) where Mr Hatcher SC argued that the ‘principles that emerge from the 
judgment [in Kable]…are wide-ranging’. 
58
  Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51, 111.  See Gummow J agreeing at 139-140. 
59
  For example, Michael Sexton and Julia Quilter, ‘Privative Clauses and State Constitutions’ (2003)  
5(4) Constitutional Law & Policy Review 69, 74. 
60
  Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51, 114. 
61
  Ibid 143. 
62
  Ibid 141. 
63
  Ibid. 
64
  Chief Justice Spigelman, ‘The Centrality of Jurisdictional Error’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 77, 79. 
65
  Gypsy Jokers (2008) 234 CLR 532, [161] (Crennan J). 
66
  Forge (2006) 228 CLR 45, [57]. 
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character of its Supreme Court that it ceases to meet the constitutional description…the 
relevant principle is one which hinges upon maintenance of the defining characteristics of 
a “court”, or in cases concerning a Supreme Court, the defining characteristics of a State 
Supreme Court.
67
 
 
The majority in Kirk followed this thinking in referring to the need for Supreme Courts to 
continue in existence and to do so in such a way as to remain true to their 
constitutionally recognised form.68  The point was further pursued in Wainohu by French 
CJ and Kiefel J.69   
 
There is, at one level, some attraction in the proposition that Kirk produces a 
retroversion of the Kable principle - by focusing on what cannot be taken away from a 
Supreme Court by a state parliament as opposed to what functions it cannot be given.70  
Yet the distinction is a difficult one to sustain.  As a simple initial point, in bestowing upon 
a court an unconventional curial function, the parliament may (in effect) be removing an 
aspect of the conventional judicial process in that context.71  More importantly however, 
the symmetry in the cases is clear and unavoidable; the consistent focus of Kable and 
subsequent case law has been the maintenance of institutional integrity - the core of 
what makes an institution a ‘court’.  Whether this core is jeopardised by addition or 
subtraction is somewhat beside the point.  The sustained constitutional purpose here is 
the retention of the essential character of state courts forming part of the Australian court 
hierarchy, to ensure that they remain able to operate in a manner that is consistent with 
their constitutional functions.72  The Kirk decision is clearly a direct example of that.  It 
reflects the High Court’s dissatisfaction with the possibility that a ‘Supreme Court’ may 
be ‘white-anted’73 so that it lacks the basic elements required for it to retain the title of, 
and fulfil the constitutional functions of, ‘Supreme Court of a State’.74   
 
Ultimately Kirk is best understood, in constitutional law terms, as a graft of the decision 
handed down in Kable, with both ultimately deriving from the integrated court structure 
held up by Chapter III.  Kirk builds, self-assuredly, on the notion that state Supreme 
Courts have a constitutionally defined place in the Australian court hierarchy.  The wider 
implications of this constitutional role for the composition, operation and regulation of 
such courts is considered briefly in the next section.  However, it should be emphasised 
                                                 
67
  Ibid [63].   
68
  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, [96].  
69
  (2011) 85 ALJR 746, [47]-[47]. 
70
  See, Chief Justice Marilyn Warren, ‘The Dog That Regained its Bark: A New Era of Administrative  
Justice in the Australian States’ (Speech delivered to the Australian Institute of Administrative Law Conference, 
Sydney, 23 July 2010) 14-15. 
71
  This was borne out in the facts in Wainohu where the majority discerned that the Crime (Criminal Organisations 
Control) Act 2009 (NSW) ‘support[ed] inscrutable decision-making’ by Supreme Court judges (acting in a 
personal capacity) in not requiring reasons to be given: (2011) 85 ALJR 746, [109] (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan 
and Bell JJ). See also at [69] (French CJ, and Kiefel J). 
72
  This, of course, does not require them to have the same constitutional characteristics and judicial  
functions as federal courts: K-Generation (2009) 237 CLR 501, [88] (French CJ);  Chief Justice Marilyn Warren, 
‘The Dog That Regained its Bark: A New Era of Administrative Justice in the Australian States’ (Speech 
delivered to the Australian Institute of Administrative Law Conference, Sydney, 23 July 2010) 14-15. 
73
  Transcript of Proceedings, Kirk & Anor v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW & Anor [2009] HCATrans 239 
(1 October 2009) (Heydon J). 
74
  The High Court has made it clear that it is the substance of the Court more than the name which is important: 
Transcript of Proceedings, Kirk & Anor v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW & Anor [2009] HCATrans 238 
(30 September 2009) (French CJ).  See also Parkin v James (1905) 2 CLR 315, 330 (Griffith CJ, Barton and 
O’Connor JJ). 
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here that the particular contribution of Kirk is an enormously important one for broader 
public law purposes.  The constitutional responsibility identified here for the Supreme 
Court represents what many consider to be a fundamental component of the rule of 
law.75  Its theoretical and practical entrenchment in Kirk ensures that in the vast 
expanses of state executive activity and lower court process, powers will be exercised 
within basic legal boundaries.76 
 
Future Directions? 
 
Kirk has, in the state Supreme Court context, made a significant contribution to an 
accumulating list of constitutionally-protected curial attributes.  While Kirk’s identified 
attribute is unique to Supreme Courts,77 it joins a broader list of characteristics which 
apply to state courts more generally including ‘independence, impartiality, fairness and 
adherence to the open-court principle’.78  The particular contribution of Kirk is the 
practical shape it gives to what Hayne J classed in the Kirk hearings as the ‘irreducible 
minimum of supervision’.79  This now unequivocally includes the issue of the prerogative 
writs on the ground of jurisdictional error regardless of the import of a privative clause - 
replicating the protection accorded to the High Court’s own s 75(v) review jurisdiction in 
the Constitution.80  Incidentally, this development illustrates the constitutional reality 
(previously acknowledged by Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ) that different state 
courts may have different constitutional personalities,81 with some of the foundational 
attributes of superior state courts extending beyond those of the courts below them. 
 
The new protection of the state Supreme Courts’ power to intervene in cases of 
jurisdictional error is unlikely to be easily circumvented.  Recent experience suggests 
that the High Court will closely scrutinise attempts to indirectly ‘oust’82 the supervisory 
jurisdiction that was underlined in Kirk.  Attempts might include, for example, the levying 
of grossly high filing fees for litigants seeking prerogative relief or the imposition of 
inflexible time limits for the commencement of review proceedings.  The latter is 
                                                 
75
  See eg Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, [5] (Gleeson CJ).  See also Chief Justice Spigelman, ‘The Centrality 
of Jurisdictional Error’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 77, 81; Mary Crock and Edward Santow, ‘Privative Clauses 
and the Limits of the Law’ in Matthew Groves and HP Lee (eds), Australian Administrative Law: Fundamentals, 
Principles and Doctrines (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 345, 366. 
76
  See further the pre-Kirk analysis in Denise Meyerson, ‘State and Federal Privative Clauses: Not So Different 
After All’ (2005) 16 Public Law Review 39, where the author relies upon rights-based public law theories in 
arguing for a guaranteed state supervisory jurisdiction.  See also Chief Justice Spigelman, ‘Integrity and 
Privative Clauses’ (The Third Lecture in the 2004 National Lecture Series for the Australian Institute of 
Administrative Law, 2 September 2004, Brisbane) 9.  Cf the comments in Mark Aronson, ‘Commentary on “The 
Entrenched Minimum Provision of Judicial Review and The Rule of Law” by Leighton McDonald’ (2010) 21 
Public Law Review 14, 37ff. 
77
  Note also that in Wainohu, French CJ and Kiefel J indicate that the giving of reasons, at least for ‘final’ or 
‘important interlocutory decisions’, is also a constitutionalised aspect of state Supreme Court operation: 
Wainohu (2011) 85 ALJR 746, [44], [57]. 
78
  Totani (2010) 85 ALJR 19, [62] (French CJ); See also, K-Generation (2009) 237 CLR 501, [255]-[256] (Kirby J); 
Gypsy Jokers (2008) 234 CLR 532, [10] (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ); Fardon (2004) 223 CLR 
575, [41]-[42] (McHugh J); North Australian Aboriginal Legal Service Inc v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146, [29] 
(McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ) (‘Bradley’); Silbert v Director of Public 
Prosecutions (WA) (2004) 217 CLR 181, [25] (Kirby J); Totani (2010) 85 ALJR 19, [443] (Kiefel J); Hinch (2011) 
85 ALJR 398. 
79
  Transcript of Proceedings, Kirk & Anor v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW & Anor [2009] HCATrans 239 
(1 October 2009). 
80
  Section 75(v) vests original jurisdiction in the High Court in all cases ‘in which a writ of  
Mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth’. 
81
  Forge (2006) 228 CLR 45, [82]-[85] (Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ). 
82
  Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, [73] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
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potentially very important given the prominence of carefully prescribed time constraints 
in certain fields of state law.  However, there seems to be little scope for attempted 
circumvention of the Kirk decision in this manner83 – particularly because of the apparent 
ready transferability of the High Court reasoning in Bodruddaza v Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.84  In that case, the High Court found that 
restrictions on the High Court’s own s 75(v) review process, such as time limits, would 
only be constitutional where they did not (whether directly or in practical effect) ‘so curtail 
or limit the right or ability of applicants to seek relief under s 75(v) as to be inconsistent 
with the place of the provision in the constitutional structure’.85  This conclusion drew 
heavily on the Court’s decision in Plaintiff S15786 and resulted, in Bodruddaza, in the 
striking down of a provision which sought to limit the time in which a migration litigant 
could seek a remedy in the High Court.  As has been emphasised by Chief Justice 
Spigelman, it seems that time bar provisions in state legislation could not validly 
compromise the Supreme Court supervisory jurisdiction given constitutional protection 
by Kirk.87  The detail of the reasoning in Bodruddaza indicates that federal time limits 
would only be likely to avoid ‘constitutional difficulties’ if they took account of 
‘supervening events’,88 and situations such as where a party only learns that a decision 
was corrupt once the review period has expired.89  It is very likely that the state Supreme 
Courts’ newly protected jurisdiction will be approached in a similar manner. 
 
While the constitutional protection of the Supreme Court’s supervisory role is now 
clear,90 the pivotal notion of ‘jurisdictional error’ itself is of course notoriously elusive – 
with resulting unpredictability in the specific practical content of the Supreme Courts’ 
protected jurisdiction.  Kirk’s somewhat neglected, unsteady contribution to the  
development of the notion of jurisdictional error is examined further below, in the course 
of a broader attempt to re-conceptualise some of the difficulty attending the notion and 
offer a pathway forward.  Administrative law has much work to do here, and the task has 
clearly grown in importance. 
 
Where to now for Administrative Law? 
 
The hapless ‘Privative Clause’ 
 
The most immediate practical impact of the Kirk decision on Australian public law comes 
from the fact that it authoritatively re-marks the boundaries of the protection afforded by 
state privative clauses.  The joint judges emphasised that their conclusions did not spell 
invalidity for all state privative clauses,91 however, clearly these are now necessarily of 
limited effect as they will be read down (or invalidated) in the face of identified 
jurisdictional error.  To a degree this simply reinforces traditional interpretive techniques 
                                                 
83
  See eg the discussion in Chief Justice Spigelman, ‘The Centrality of Jurisdictional Error’ (2010) 21 Public Law 
Review 77, 89-90. 
84
  Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2007) 228 CLR 651 (‘Bodruddaza’). 
85
  Ibid [53] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
86
  (2003) 211 CLR 476. 
87
  Chief Justice Spigelman, ‘The Centrality of Jurisdictional Error’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 77, 89.  
88
  Bodruddaza (2007) 228 CLR 651, [59], [57] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
89
  This example was given by Gleeson CJ in Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, [39]. 
90
  This was recently re-affirmed in Totani (2010) 85 ALJR 19, [26] (French CJ), [128] (Gummow J). 
91
  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, [100]. 
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long employed across jurisdictions, whereby restrictive readings92 (eg of privative 
clauses that only protect ‘decisions’) often narrowed the protective reach of such clauses 
to non-jurisdictional error.  However, as noted above, Kirk is a seemingly terminal blow 
to the assumption in Australia that state parliaments could, if they really tried, craft a 
privative clause that evades the traditional textual confinement.93  Totani confirmed94 that 
bolder contemporary drafting techniques, such as the extension of privative clauses to 
‘purported decisions’,95 now suffer the same difficulties in the state Supreme Court 
context as they do in the context of original High Court review.96   
 
The Kirk decision similarly brought to the state level in Australia the continued erosion of 
the old Hickman approach to privative clause interpretation.  The traditional Hickman 
notion was essentially that privative clause protection could be effective provided that 
certain manifest errors were avoided.97  A bolder reading (that such protection would be 
effective in those circumstances) had gradually become popular in government circles.98  
Yet this version was dealt a firm blow when the High Court in 2003 (in Plaintiff S157) 
made it clear again, just on first principles, that Hickman was only a construction aid for 
use in reconciling the specific internal contradiction arising where a statute mixed ouster 
of judicial review with a conferral of limited powers.99  The High Court shifted the focus in 
this reconciliation exercise to the identification of ‘inviolable’ or ‘essential’ conditions 
(also implicit in Hickman100 and further developed soon after101), but did not completely 
dismiss the relevance of Hickman’s manifest error formula.102  Of course in S157 itself, 
weighing heavily in the whole process was the constitutional immutability of the High 
Court’s s 75(v) jurisdiction and the terminological infirmity of a privative clause declaring 
protection only for a ‘decision…under this Act’.103  
 
Following Plaintiff S157 an aggregated approach emerged in difficult cases at the state 
level in Australia, obviously in the absence at that point of overriding constitutional 
                                                 
92
  For a valuable brief history, see Robin Creyke and John McMillan, Control of Government Action: Text, Cases & 
Commentary (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2
nd
 ed, 2009), 1040ff.  For arguments mapping the potential step up 
from traditional interpretative presumptions to acknowledgement of ‘fundamental’ and immutable rights, see 
Denise Meyerson, ‘State and Federal Privative Clauses: Not So Different After All’ (2005) 16 Public Law Review 
39, 47. 
93
  See eg the prominent decision in Mitchforce (2003) 57 NSWLR 212 (discussed below); cf also Woolworths Ltd 
v Hawke (1998) 45 NSWLR 13. 
94
  Totani (2010) 85 ALJR 19, esp French CJ at [26]ff.  Cf Wainohu (2011) 85 ALJR 746, eg [15] (French CJ and 
Kiefel J).   
95
  For discussion of some of the history of the ‘purported decision’ privative clause, see eg Chief Justice 
Spigelman, ‘The Centrality of Jurisdictional Error’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 77, 82.  See further Mary Crock 
and Edward Santow, ‘Privative Clauses and the Limits of the Law’ in Matthew Groves and HP Lee (eds), 
Australian Administrative Law: Fundamentals, Principles and Doctrines (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
345, 363ff. 
96
  See Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476; and particularly Bodruddaza (2007) 228 CLR 651. 
97
  R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598, 615 (‘Hickman’) and the reference there to the 
basic requirements of bona fides, relation to the subject matter of the legislation, and reasonable referability to 
the power conferred. 
98
  Cf Chief Justice Spigelman, ‘Integrity and Privative Clauses’ (The Third Lecture in the 2004 National Lecture 
Series for the Australian Institute of Administrative Law, Brisbane, 2 September 2004) 8. 
99
  See Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, [60]ff per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ; cf Minister 
for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALJR 992, [29]-[30], [40]ff. 
100
  R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598, 616 (Dixon J). 
101
  R v Murray; Ex parte Proctor (1949) 77 CLR 387; R v Metal Trades Employees’ Association; Ex parte 
Amalgamated Engineering Union (1951) 82 CLR 208. 
102
  Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, [20], [91].  
103
  Ibid [19], [71]ff. 
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considerations.104  For privative clause protection to be effective, satisfaction of the 
Hickman provisos (ie the avoidance of the listed ‘manifest errors’) was required but not 
sufficient.  A second step was needed (to the extent that it was distinct105), which 
involved a search for breach of inviolable (or ‘indispensable’/ ‘essential’) conditions or 
limitations.  In the pre-Kirk NSW Court of Appeal decision in Mitchforce,106 for example, 
Spigelman CJ confirmed the applicability of a privative clause107 to a serious error of the 
Industrial Relations Commission - on the basis that the error was not in breach of the 
Hickman provisos or any inviolable limit on power.108  Interestingly, inviolability here was 
defined via a ‘reconciliation’ that made particular reference to the strength of the 
privative clause’s extension to ‘purported decisions’.  This point is explored further 
below. 
 
Mitchforce has been rendered somewhat redundant by the High Court’s pronouncement 
on the state position in Kirk, in which the constitutional considerations came through 
more dominantly than in Plaintiff S157.  Hickman was mentioned only incidentally in the 
joint judgment in Kirk; simply on the point that the law regarding privative clauses must 
begin from the proposition that they present a contradiction to be resolved.109  However, 
their Honours then quickly declared that the matter was ‘not just a conundrum of 
contrariety’ with respect to the terms of one statute, and moved on to their ‘fundamental 
constitutional considerations’ that were examined above.110  What room is left for 
Hickman and its focus on a narrow category of ‘manifest error’?  Early indications, post-
Kirk, are that Hickman is now considered of little relevance at state level as the 
effectiveness of a privative clause turns essentially upon the existence (or not) of 
jurisdictional error.111  This is supported by recent (and admittedly conventional) 
academic comment that the Hickman formula is just an indicator of more severe forms of 
jurisdictional error112 - marking out a ‘core content’ of that notion that has long been 
subject to a strong presumption of reviewability113 but whose significance is now lost with 
the full range of jurisdictional error remaining reviewable.   
 
Hickman may conceivably retain a background presence via the slim academic 
possibility114 that some error might yet prove to be not ‘jurisdictional’ (on more flexible 
                                                 
104
  Cf in the federal context the pre-Plaintiff S157 migration decision in NAAV (2002) 123 FCR 298. 
105
  See eg the discussion in Chief Justice Spigelman, ‘Integrity and Privative Clauses’ (The Third Lecture in the 
2004 National Lecture Series for the Australian Institute of Administrative Law, Brisbane, 2 September 2004) 9; 
Michael Sexton and Julia Quilter, ‘Privative Clauses and State Constitutions’ (2003) 5(4) Constitutional Law & 
Policy Review 69, 72. 
106
  Mitchforce (2003) 57 NSWLR 212. 
107
  This was in fact an earlier incarnation of the privative clause examined in Kirk (s 179 of the Industrial Relations 
Act 1996 (NSW)). 
108
  (2003) 57 NSWLR 212, [92]ff. 
109
  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, [94]. 
110
  Ibid. 
111
  See particularly Director General NSW Dept of Health v IRC (NSW) [2010] NSWCA 47. 
112
  See eg Chris Finn, ‘Constitutionalising Supervisory Review at State Level: The End of Hickman?’ (2010) 21 
Public Law Review 92, 103.  Cf Chief Justice Marilyn Warren, ‘The Dog That Regained its Bark: A New Era of 
Administrative Justice in the Australian States’ (Speech delivered to the Australian Institute of Administrative 
Law Conference, Sydney, 23 July 2010) 15. 
113
  See Chief Justice Spigelman, ‘The Centrality of Jurisdictional Error’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 77, 82; Chief 
Justice Spigelman, ‘Integrity and Privative Clauses’ (The Third Lecture in the 2004 National Lecture Series for 
the Australian Institute of Administrative Law, Brisbane, 2 September 2004) 8. 
114
  Ct the comments in Chief Justice Marilyn Warren, ‘The Dog That Regained its Bark: A New Era of 
Administrative Justice in the Australian States’ (Speech delivered to the Australian Institute of Administrative 
Law Conference, Sydney, 23 July 2010) 15. 
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understandings of the term – see below) but still fall foul of the pre-set ‘manifest error’ 
formula.  Of greater practical significance is the fact that in this whole equation the 
precise position of the Federal Court, with its lesser constitutional connection, has been 
underexplored to date.  Logic and existing discussion indicates are that there may be 
little joy to be had in attempting to extrapolate from S157 and Kirk some reinforcement of 
Federal Court supervisory jurisdiction.115  If the constitutional guarantee of judicial review 
cannot be somehow extended to the Federal Court, one implication is of course that this 
context could provide a final refuge for the Hickman methodology.  The Federal Court 
position, and the fact that cross-court consistency may in fact be within reach, is 
discussed further below.   
 
Not surprisingly in the wake of Kirk, some commentators have reminded us that there 
may in fact be good policy reasons for insulating certain decisions from review (eg the 
acute importance in some contexts of specialist expertise and/or finality).116  And there 
has been some discussion of how exactly state parliaments might still successfully 
impede review of jurisdictional type errors.117  The latter discussion is largely beyond the 
scope of this article, however it might be noted that thus far there is little basis for 
optimism amongst interested parliamentary drafters. 
 
The High Court on jurisdictional error: circularity, compromise or stalled 
clarification? 
 
Broadly speaking then, from an Australian administrative law perspective there is an 
appealing simplicity in the essential reasoning of Kirk118 - chiefly in the fact that it 
removes a layer of administrative law complexity at state level.  The question ‘what can 
privative clauses protect?’ has in broad terms become a much simpler one.  Yet 
substantial questions are left behind.  Kirk turns us back to the perennial administrative 
law difficulty: what is ‘jurisdictional error’?  Indeed the progressive constitutionalisation of 
the courts’ supervisory jurisdiction over jurisdictional error, most particularly through the 
                                                 
115
  See eg Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510, [14], [21], [58] (Gleeson CJ and McHugh J), [231]ff (Kirby 
J), [273] (Callinan J); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; Stack v 
Coast Securities (No 9) Pty Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 261, 281 (Gibbs CJ); SZAJB v Minister for Immigration and 
Citizenship (2008) 168 FCR 410, [32]-[36] (French J), [114] (Tracey J); Fisher v Minister for Immigration and 
Citizenship (2007) 162 FCR 299, [39] (Stone J); SZJYV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 
731 (16 May 2007) [5] (Downes J); NAAV (2002) 123 FCR 298, [504] (French J).  See also Linda Kirk, ‘Privative 
Clauses and the Federal Parliament’ (Gilbert & Tobin Centre Constitutional Law Conference, Sydney, 21 
February 2003) 14; Linda Kirk, ‘Chapter III and Legislative Interference with the Judicial Process: Abebe v 
Commonwealth and Nicholas v The Queen’ in Adrienne Stone and George Williams (eds), The High Court at 
the Crossroads – Essays in Constitutional Law (2000) 119, 131; Chief Justice Spigelman, ‘The Centrality of 
Jurisdictional Error’ (Keynote Address AGS Administrative Law Symposium: Commonwealth and New South 
Wales, Sydney, 25 March 2010) 40.   
116
  See particularly Nick Gouliaditis, ‘Privative Clauses: Epic Fail’ (Gilbert & Tobin Centre for Public Law 2010 
Constitutional Law Conference, Sydney, 19 February 2010); Cf Mark Aronson, ‘Commentary on “The 
Entrenched Minimum Provision of Judicial Review and the Rule of Law” by Leighton McDonald’ (2010) 21 
Public Law Review 35 (note particularly his emphasis on the relevance of the existence (or not) of other legal 
accountability mechanisms – and cf the result in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corp Ltd (2008) 
237 CLR 146). 
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  See eg Nick Gouliaditis, ‘Privative Clauses: Epic Fail’ (Gilbert & Tobin Centre for Public Law 2010 Constitutional 
Law Conference, Sydney, 19 February 2010); Chris Finn, ‘Constitutionalising Supervisory Review at State 
Level: The End of Hickman?’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 92; Chief Justice Spigelman, ‘The Centrality of 
Jurisdictional Error’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 77; Mark Aronson, ‘Commentary on “The Entrenched 
Minimum Provision of Judicial Review and the Rule of Law” by Leighton McDonald’ (2010) 21 Public Law 
Review 14. 
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  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531. 
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decisions in Plaintiff S157 and Kirk, has placed increasing weight upon this long-troubled 
and awkwardly expanding concept.119 
 
As a suitable starting point, clearly the distinction between jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional error is alive and well in Australia.120  The distinction now has constitutional 
significance in both the state and federal spheres.  Beyond this the path ahead is not 
much clearer post-Kirk, but as will be seen it is now once again an interesting one.   
 
At a simple level Kirk was a state level replication of the federally-focused decision in 
Plaintiff S157 – largely mirroring that decision as regards the constitutional confinement 
of privative clauses.  However, there is a deeper synergy between the cases for present 
purposes, as regards the conceptual difficulties attending the notion of ‘jurisdictional 
error’.  In the years between these cases the Australian High Court stepped over much 
of the difficulty, as the matters coming to it stayed close to well-worn precedent on basic 
procedural error, ‘jurisdictional facts’ and natural justice.121  Yet Kirk required more 
deliberate attention to the concept of jurisdictional error,122 and the tip of an interesting 
core problem resurfaced. 
   
Two errors were identified in the Industrial Court proceedings below, in respect of the 
particularisation of the charges123 and the prosecution’s calling of the defendant as a 
witness.124  The Court then embarked upon a discussion of the often-neglected history of 
jurisdictional error, with something approaching a rare ‘frank admission’125 of its context-
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  For detailed discussion of the history of ‘jurisdictional error’ in Australia (including its disappearance for a time), 
with particular reference to the influence of migration developments, see Stephen Gageler SC, ‘Impact of 
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  Chris Finn, ‘Constitutionalising Supervisory Review at State Level: The End of Hickman?’ (2010) 21 Public Law 
Review 92, 94.  Cf Leslie Zines, ‘Recent Developments in Chapter III: Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of 
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specific, conclusory and essentially functionalistic nature.126  Their Honours expressly 
declined to ‘mark the metes and bounds’ of the concept in this case, and whilst they 
recited the traditional Craig v South Australia127 formulas for the identification of 
jurisdictional error in the inferior court context, they emphasised that the boundary line 
was a fine one and that Craig should not be read as providing a rigid taxonomy.  The 
examples given in Craig, it was stressed, were just examples.128  However, having 
acknowledged the uncertain nature of jurisdictional error and the non-rigid, purely 
illustrative role of the Craig classifications, in ultimately classifying the errors before them 
as jurisdictional errors129 their Honours readily employed Craig categories without 
deeper analysis. The first error was seen to be one about the limits of the lower Court’s 
functions or powers (which in fact led it to make orders it had no power to make); and 
the second also reflected misapprehension of a limit on powers.130           
 
This all invites closer attention.  The more technically-fraught decision of Plaintiff S157 
provides a point of access to a quiet and unresolved methodological division on the 
notion of jurisdictional error in Australia that may help to explain Kirk’s awkward marriage 
of predictive formulas and admitted uncertainty, and indeed ultimately provide some 
shape to the space left open by Kirk’s professed retreat from overly formulaic 
conceptualisations of jurisdictional error.   
 
In broad terms, the Court in Plaintiff S157 was appropriately concerned with several core 
matters: the textual interpretation of the privative clause in issue; the ‘reconciliation’ of 
any resulting internal contradiction in the statute by reference to Hickman and notions of 
the ‘inviolable’131 or ‘essential’;132 and the identification of a jurisdictional error.  
Importantly however, and reflective of underlying difficulty, in places the various inquiries 
are conflated to some extent,133 such that the decision as a whole has an air of 
circularity.  To oversimplify the point, in such a case is an error not protected by a 
privative clause because it is ‘jurisdictional’, or is an error ‘jurisdictional’ because it is not 
protected by the reconciled privative clause?134  To re-conceptualise and broaden the 
                                                 
126
  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, [60]ff.  Cf the comments in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex 
Parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165, [121] (Kirby J). 
127
  Craig (1995) 184 CLR 163. 
128
  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, [71]-[73].  Cf Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 
CLR 323, [82] (McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ) (‘Yusuf’). 
129
  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, [71]ff.  Contrast the conclusions in the Court of Appeal below: Kirk v Industrial 
Relations Commission of New South Wales [2008] NSWCA 156. 
130
  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, [74]-[77].  The joint majority also noted, somewhat incidentally, that the errors 
appeared in the reasons for decision, and hence ‘on the face of the record’ as that expression must be 
understood in the light of ss 69(3) and (4) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW).  Most importantly in this last 
respect, the Court’s obiter comments here indicate that it is poised to critically revisit Craig’s restrictive 
interpretation of ‘the record’ (absent such statutory modification), and the appropriateness of its consequential 
constraint upon the general availability of certiorari for non-jurisdictional error. 
131
  Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, [20]ff (Gleeson CJ). 
132
  (2003) 211 CLR 476, [69] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
133
  See esp Ibid [76]-[78].  Upon reading down the privative clause to exclude jurisdictional error (by reference to 
old textual confinement principles and constitutional considerations), their Honours indicated that it may then be 
necessary to proceed to the ‘reconciliation’ process to determine whether a particular failure is or is not a 
jurisdictional error.  See also the clear inclusion of the privative clause itself in the reconciliation and 
assessment process at [69].  Cf Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex Parte 
Applicants S134/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 441, [72] (Gaudron and Kirby JJ). 
134
  For a suggestion that there may be scope within the terms of Plaintiff S157 for a re-subdivision of jurisdictional 
errors (serious v less-serious) in the context of privative clause interpretation, see Chief Justice Spigelman, 
‘Integrity and Privative Clauses’ (The Third Lecture in the 2004 National Lecture Series for the Australian 
Institute of Administrative Law, Brisbane, 2 September 2004) 10-11. 
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problem, is the notion of jurisdictional error to some extent externally-defined and 
dropped into a court’s reasoning at the appropriate point, or does it emerge internally 
from the court’s interpretation of the specific legislative intention on what is essential to a 
particular decision?  If it is to be some combination of both, does the latter really leave 
much room for the former?  Whether by reason of the particular natural justice context or 
its deliberate ‘fuzziness’,135 Plaintiff S157 did not clearly admit nor rationalise the 
alternation.  Conceivably we could try to explain and sustain an awkward compromise, 
however there is now a pressing need for coherency in Australia in view of the 
expanding constitutional law dimension.  And given the growing acknowledgment of the 
utilitarian history of jurisdictional error and its lack of a clear independent meaning, 
perhaps the time is right to further explore what the internally-focused alternative, 
generalised and formalised, might look like. 
 
Read to its full potential, Plaintiff S157 could have prompted a general drift to a more 
statute-specific approach to jurisdictional error (one to which the presence of a privative 
clause would logically be relevant).  Such a reading finds support in Gleeson CJ’s 
discussions in the case and apparent concern to confirm that a breach of natural justice, 
although generally assumed to be a jurisdictional error, was indeed a breach of an 
‘inviolable’ condition in the specific (whole) statutory context.136  The other possible 
reading, a narrower one rationalising the compromise referred to above, is that the more 
statute-specific approach applies only to the classification of particular less-easily 
categorised instances of serious error, or to the classification of breaches of express 
prescriptions.137  This narrower reading perhaps finds support in the joint majority’s quick 
externally-referenced categorisation of the natural justice error as ‘jurisdictional’ without 
any clear attention to specific legislative purpose.138   
 
The difference in the alternative approaches is easily blurred139 - by the inevitably 
complex contexts for such classifications, by the general preference for an instinctive 
rather than organised approach, and indeed by the obvious fact that the critical source of 
external assistance, the Craig categories, themselves lead attention to legislative terms 
and sometimes (if discerningly handled) to the critical matter of legislative intention on 
the significance of particular error.  Yet the important point of principle here, the neglect 
of which breeds ongoing uncertainty, is occasionally brought into sharp relief in the lower 
Australian courts.  In 2009, Hodgson JA of the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
commented:140 
 
                                                 
135
  Mark Aronson, ‘Commentary on “The Entrenched Minimum Provision of Judicial Review and the Rule of Law” 
by Leighton McDonald’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 14, 38. 
136
  (2003) 211 CLR 476, 31ff (note the express inclusion of the privative clause in the ‘reconciliation’. Cf also 
Callinan J at [159].  Cf the potentially broad comments (albeit in the uncontentious context of simple procedural 
defect – see below) in SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 
294, [72] (McHugh J).  See also the breadth of the comments in NAIS v Minister for Immigration and Indigenous 
Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 470, [71]ff (Kirby J), and Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte 
Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165, [123] (Kirby J). 
137
  Cf the comments in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex Parte Applicants 
S134/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 441, [72] (Gaudron and Kirby JJ); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALJR 992, [49]-[50] per Gummow and Hayne JJ, [92] (Kirby J). 
138
  (2003) 211 CLR 476, [83].  Cf Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 
78 ALJR 992, [92] (Kirby J). 
139
  See eg Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALJR 992, [49]-[50] 
(Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
140
  Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act v New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council [2009] NSWCA 352, 
[37]ff (Hodgson JA). 
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 Basten JA relied on Craig v South Australia …for the proposition that … for an 
administrative decision-maker to approach the exercise of a statutory function on a 
legally erroneous basis is to commit a reviewable error.  I have already given my 
understanding of the effect of Craig (as explained in Yusuf), which is that it indicates what 
may be jurisdictional errors, but does not avoid the need to consider particular statutory 
regimes, including any privative clause, in order to decide what would amount to 
jurisdictional errors in particular cases. 
 
Irrespective of whether Basten JA’s approach is correctly summarised here, the 
theoretical division is clear.  So conceptualised, how have the alternative approaches 
fared? The role of the specific statutory ‘reconciliation’ in the interpretation of a privative 
clause is of course reasonably well established,141 as is the broad importance of 
legislative intention to the notion of jurisdictional error.  The extrapolated notion that 
specific statutory intention necessarily informs the identification of jurisdictional error, 
often with the logical correlative that a privative clause has a role via ‘reconciliation’, has 
been pursued sporadically in specific commentary and arguments put to courts.142  
However, this approach has struggled since Plaintiff S157 – particularly with respect to 
the role of the privative clause.  It appeared to suffer at the hands of general 
assumptions that such an approach would unduly narrow the concept of jurisdictional 
error.  These concerns were no doubt in part fueled by early cavalier calls on such logic 
to try to save traditional ‘narrow’ jurisdictional errors (prompting one suggestion that 
reconciliation was sometimes ‘impossible’ rather than just unable to save the 
government decision).143  And this nervousness was no doubt exacerbated by the 
powerful operation given to privative clauses in certain prominent lower court statutory 
reconciliations.144  Moreover, the High Court clearly flagged its wish to avoid a return to 
the (different but related) generic argument that a privative clause and satisfaction of 
Hickman necessarily ‘extended’ the decision-making powers in question by reference to 
some minimum requirement of bona fides.145  After some further misfiring of the full 
reconciliation argument, 146 of course ultimately the constitutional dimension reached the 
all-important state level.  And the constitutional confinement of privative clauses in this 
                                                 
141
  See particularly the discussions on point in Plaintiff S157/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 476; cf also, for example, 
Batterham v QSR (2006) 225 CLR 237, [25] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Crennan JJ); Darling 
Casino Limited v New South Wales Casino Control Authority (1997) 191 CLR 602 (Gaudron and Gummow JJ).  
For further discussion (and critique), see eg Chief Justice Spigelman, ‘Integrity and Privative Clauses’ (The 
Third Lecture in the 2004 National Lecture Series for the Australian Institute of Administrative Law, Brisbane, 2 
September 2004) 9; Mark Aronson, ‘Commentary on “The Entrenched Minimum Provision of Judicial Review 
and the Rule of Law” by Leighton McDonald’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 14, 37. 
142
  See prominent examples in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex Parte 
Applicants S134/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 441, [77] (Gaudron and Kirby JJ); Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALJR 992, [91] (Kirby J); cf SAAP v Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294, [41] (McHugh J). 
143
  Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex Parte Applicants S134/2002 (2003) 211 
CLR 441, [77]ff (Gaudron and Kirby JJ); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v 
SGLB (2004) 78 ALJR 992. 
144
  See particularly NAAV (2002) 123 FCR 298; Mitchforce v Industrial Relations Commission (2003) 57 NSWLR 
212. 
145
  See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALJR 992, [29]-[30], 
[48]ff (Gummow and Hayne JJ); and see also the exchanges between counsel and court in that case and in the 
unsuccessful special leave applications for Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v 
Scargill and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Lobo (High Court of Australia, 
Gummow J, 13 February 2004) – extracted in Caron Beaton-Wells, ‘Judicial Review of Migration Decisions: Life 
after S157’ (2005) 33 Federal Law Review 141, 158. 
146
  Importantly, a half attempt to re-apply the full logic of reconciliation faltered in the 2007 case of Bodruddaza: the 
boldly worded time limit ouster there was necessarily weakened by its person-specific operation: Bodruddaza v 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2007) 228 CLR 651, [28]-[29] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, 
Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
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context appears to have brought with it a quicker disregard147 of the potential role of 
such clauses in interpretative reconciliation (as discussed below).   
 
All the while, in the background to these problems with an internally-focused approach, 
there remained the more accessible pre-mixed definitions of jurisdictional error from 
Craig (which had gained particular prominence via the migration decision of Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf148).  Not surprisingly then, in operational 
terms, the concerted intention-focused approach to jurisdictional error has not been too 
keenly explored,149 and indeed aspects of it have been expressly abandoned or criticised 
in recent commentary.150  
 
The internal ‘essentiality’ approach assessed and applied 
 
What can be said at a more theoretical level?  Notions of essentiality, ‘inviolability’ and 
‘imperative’ duties – obviously all built on a view of specific legislative intention – have 
long featured in assessments of the seriousness and consequences of errors in 
Australia.151  And these ideas have periodically been readily attached to the notion of 
jurisdictional error (in identifying at least a species of jurisdictional error).152  It is clear 
that currently this conceptualisation of jurisdictional error is often bypassed (eg for 
natural justice), or overlain by the generic Craig153 formulas.  However, in considering 
the continued worth of this split methodology it is important to remember the courts have 
remained securely and effectively focused on specific legislative intention for some 
important classes of relevant error: for example in the identification of jurisdictional 
facts154 or the search for an invalidating procedural error.155  Particularly in the latter 
context, High Court judges have willingly embraced notions of statutory essentiality and 
equated that with ‘jurisdiction’.156  In one prominent decision, a no-invalidity clause (the 
                                                 
147
  See eg Totani (2010) 85 ALJR 19, [26]ff (French CJ); and most recently Wainohu (2011) 85 ALJR 746, eg [15] 
(French CJ and Kiefel J). 
148
  Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323, esp [82] (McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).     
149
  See generally the analysis of the Federal Court patterns in Caron Beaton-Wells, ‘Judicial Review of Migration 
Decisions: Life after S157’ (2005) 33 Federal Law Review 141, esp 143ff.   
150
  See eg Leighton McDonald, ‘The Entrenched Minimum Provision of Judicial Review and the Rule of Law’ 
(2010) 21 Public Law Review 14, 17; Chris Finn, ‘Constitutionalising Supervisory Review At State Level: The 
End of Hickman?’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 92, 104ff.  Cf Caron Beaton-Wells, ‘Judicial Review of Migration 
Decisions: Life after S157’ (2005) 33 Federal Law Review 141 (but note the comments at 173). 
151
  See the emphasis for example in R v Metal Trades Employees’ Association; Ex parte Amalgamated 
Engineering Union (1951) 82 CLR 208, 248 (Dixon J); R v Coldham; Ex parte Australian Workers’ Union (1982) 
153 CLR 415, 419 (Mason ACJ and Brennan J); Darling Casino Limited v New South Wales Casino Control 
Authority (1997) 191 CLR 602 (Gaudron and Gummow JJ). 
152
  See eg SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294, [72] 
(McHugh J); cf NAIS v Minister for Immigration and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 470, [71]ff (Kirby J).  
And of course see Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, [76]-[78] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne 
JJ). 
153
  Craig (1995) 184 CLR 163.  
154
  See eg Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALJR 992. 
155
  Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; Minister for Immigration and 
Citizenship v SZIZO (2009) 238 CLR 627; cf Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZKTI (2009) 238 CLR 
489. 
156
  SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294 esp McHugh J 
(and see also Gummow J, Kirby J and Hayne J – Kirby J acknowledging the uncertainty leapt by such a 
connection: [173]).  Cf also the comments in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs; Ex Parte Palme (2003) 216 CLR 212 (esp McHugh J).  For a recent example of ready adoption of the 
language of ‘jurisdictional error’ in the context of a Project Blue Sky procedural failure analysis; Chase Oyster 
Bar Pty Ltd v Hamo Industries Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 190, [39]ff.  For a detailed examination and development 
of the connections here, with a focus on the meaning of notions of ‘invalidity’, see Benjamin O’Donnell, 
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first cousin of the traditional privative clause) featured strongly in the statutory 
essentiality assessment.157   
 
The dilemma is whether jurisdictional facts and procedural failures (which generally arise 
from express prescriptions) should mark the limits of the clear statute-specific focus, or 
whether this is a methodology that should extend across express and implied 
prescriptions158 and be acknowledged as one that inheres in, clarifies, and can extend or 
expel the Craig categories.  Certainly a clear and meaningful distinction between 
express and implied requirements would seem to have long ago dissolved in Australian 
administrative law,159 and the High Court has clearly acknowledged the possible 
existence of ‘implied’ jurisdictional limits in an Act.160  And while it is ambitious to 
anticipate that a single methodology can be forged from the erratic history of 
jurisdictional error, at a conceptual level it is difficult to justify departures from a close 
focus on legislative purpose based simply on dissolving administrative law distinctions, 
precedents from different contexts and earlier awkward judicial attempts at predictive 
formulas.   
 
Accordingly, there is some appeal in the idea that the Australian notion of jurisdictional 
error emerged from Plaintiff S157 somewhat modernized.  However, as noted above, 
sustained serious examination of this possibility has been stifled.  The default thinking 
therefore continues - that the concept of ‘jurisdictional error’ is often an externally 
shaped one that is dropped in ‘dutifully’161 at the appropriate point, principally by 
reference to judicial instinct and the Craig formulas162 (or under-explored assumptions 
about natural justice163).  And the overall position therefore appears to be that the law of 
jurisdictional error in Australia has proceeded with one foot on each of two rafts – one 
built of judicial attempts at generic formulas and the other built of specific legislative 
intentions.164  For obvious reasons this unrationalised combination makes for difficult 
travel.   
 
In practical terms, it seems that a deliberate and more generally-applied focus on 
specific legislative intention might be a more coherent, transparent and workable 
organising principle than anything to be found in the opaque and very contestable 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘Jurisdictional Error, Invalidity and the Role of Injunction in s 75(v) of the Australian Constitution’ (2007) 28 
Australian Bar Review 291. 
157
  Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corp Ltd (2008) 237 CLR 146, [23] (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and 
Crennan JJ).  Cf Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex Parte Palme (2003) 
216 CLR 212 (esp McHugh J). 
158
  Cf in this regard the comments in Stephen Gageler SC, ‘Impact of Migration Law on the Development of 
Australian Administrative Law’ (2010) 17 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 92, 104-105; and Benjamin 
O’Donnell, ‘Jurisdictional Error, Invalidity and the Role of Injunction in s 75(v) of the Australian Constitution’ 
(2007) 28 Australian Bar Review 291, 322ff. 
159
  Consider for example the developments in the context of relevant and irrelevant considerations, exemplified in 
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24.  
160
  Eg Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611, [113] (Crennan and Bell JJ). 
161
  Chief Justice Marilyn Warren, ‘The Dog That Regained its Bark: A New Era of Administrative Justice in the 
Australian States’ (Speech delivered to the Australian Institute of Administrative Law Conference, Sydney, 23 
July 2010) 17. 
162
  Cf recently in the High Court Visscher v Giudice (2009) 239 CLR 361, [81]; Plaintiff M13/2011 v Minister for 
Immigration & Citizenship (2011) 85 ALJR 740, [22]. 
163
  See particularly Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, [40]ff, [59] (Gaudron and Gummow JJ), [142] (Kirby J), [169] (Hayne 
J); and see also Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, [25] (Gleeson CJ), [83] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, 
Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
164
  Cf Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act v New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council [2009] NSWCA 
352, [7]ff (Hodgson JA). 
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categories of jurisdictional error laid down in Craig165 – which Professor Aronson has 
noted were ‘carefully crafted to say very little indeed’.166  This broader methodology 
provides a truer rationalisation of the assessment of ‘authority’ being undertaken,167 a 
means by which we can achieve flexible and sustainable clarity in common scenarios, 
and a tool for proceeding in a principled manner in new situations.  It is also a 
methodology that can address criticisms of the problematic inferior court / tribunal 
distinction168 drawn by Craig.169  Moreover, this methodology can to some extent 
appease those dissatisfied with the new inability of state legislatures to immunise 
decision-makers from jurisdictional error review - because the presence of a strongly 
worded privative clause may have some role in determining what will be a jurisdictional 
error.  This is not to return to attributing a ‘curative’ role to privative clauses as regards 
their interaction with jurisdictional error, but rather to fully embrace the inescapably case-
specific and post hoc nature of the very concept of jurisdictional error.    
 
At first glance, the Kirk decision appears to direct us back towards the more predictive 
and formulaic approach of Craig.  The joint majority ultimately clung quite closely to the 
Craig formulations, in actually classifying the carefully identified errors as jurisdictional, 
without explicit reference to specific parliamentary intention on that point.  This is 
perhaps in part a product of the entrenched incrementalism of rulings in this area,170 and 
the fact that the addition of constitutional gravitas to the notion of ‘jurisdictional error’ 
encourages some neglect of the possibility that it has a humble source in interpretative 
grind and compromise.  Importantly however, the marked difference between the High 
Court and Full Federal Court171 conclusions on this Craig assessment again reveal the 
indeterminacy of the Craig categories.  And most importantly, as noted earlier, there 
were various signs of broader and less-formulaic thinking in the High Court joint majority 
discussions.  In the first place, support for a more flexible approach is found in their 
Honours’ reference, with apparent approval, to academic comment that the notion of 
jurisdictional error is context specific and essentially functional.172  The judges were also, 
as noted earlier, at pains to emphasise that ‘Craig is not a rigid taxonomy’ and that the 
examples of jurisdictional error given there ‘are just that – examples’.173  The broadening 
                                                 
165
  Chief Justice Spigelman has suggested at least that a simple application of Craig may now be an incomplete 
judicial response to a search for jurisdictional error of the type with which Plaintiff S157 was concerned: Chief 
Justice Spigelman, ‘Integrity and Privative Clauses’ (The Third Lecture in the 2004 National Lecture Series for 
the Australian Institute of Administrative Law, Brisbane, 2 September 2004) 11. 
166
  Mark Aronson, ‘Jurisdictional Error Without the Tears’ in Matthew Groves and HP Lee (eds), Australian 
Administrative Law: Fundamentals, Principles and Doctrines (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 330, 335. 
167
  Note the prominent emphasis on ‘authority’ in key High Court decisions: Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, [162] (per 
Hayne J); and more recently Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611, [16] 
(Gummow ACJ and Kiefel J).   
168
  Note in this context the comments in Kirk itself: (2010) 239 CLR 531, [68]ff (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, 
Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
169
  An intention-based focus has already been employed by state courts in assessments of whether a particular 
body should be dealt with as an inferior court or a tribunal for the purposes of the Craig categories: see eg Re 
Carey; Ex parte Exclude Holdings Pty Ltd (2006) 32 WAR 501; Re State Administrative Tribunal; Ex parte 
McCourt (2007) 34 WAR 342.  Cf The Returned & Services League of Australia (Vict Branch) Inc v Liquor 
Licensing Commission [1999] 2 VR 203, 213 (Phillips JA). 
170
  Cf Benjamin O’Donnell, ‘Jurisdictional Error, Invalidity and the Role of Injunction in S 75(v) of the Australian 
Constitution’ (2007) 28 Australian Bar Review 291, 333. 
171
  Contrast the conclusions below in Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales [2008] NSWCA 
156. 
172
  (2010) 239 CLR 531, [63]ff. 
173
  Ibid [73].  Cf Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323, [82] (McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
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mindset is also evident in the Court’s expression of concern over the workability of the 
court/tribunal distinction in Craig (at least in the state context).174 
 
The best description of Kirk, as regards its contribution on the notion of ‘jurisdictional 
error’, is that it stops short of a full return to the formulas of Craig and veers some way 
towards the view that jurisdictional error is a conclusory or post hoc175 concept rather 
than a predictive one.  An admission that the notion of jurisdictional error is a conclusory 
one, and insistence that the Craig categories are just examples, of course leaves the 
elephant firmly ensconced in the room.  How should Australian courts, intending parties 
and observers approach the classification?  Some proffer a focus on ‘seriousness’ of 
error,176 protection of fundamental rights,177 avoidance of ‘miscarriages of justice’,178 or 
notions of institutional integrity.179 Some emphasise notions of ‘invalidity’ under related 
interpretive tests180 or ideas of ‘essentiality’181 in a manner loosely consistent with the 
core of the arguments advanced here.  And sometimes it is just conceded that there 
perhaps can be no single theory or logical process for the identification of jurisdictional 
error.182  However, threading through much of this commentary is a level of satisfaction 
with the courts’ ability to read a statute and divine parliamentary purpose – a process 
with which administrative law has long engaged.  And the corresponding judicial 
confidence, evident for example in the broader thinking of Gleeson CJ in Plaintiff S157, 
has an unharnessed organisational potential that may ultimately leave Craig looking like 
something of a distraction.   
 
The measure applicable in a deliberate and generalised parliamentary-intention based 
approach is found in the notions of ‘essentiality’,183 ‘inviolability’184 and ‘indispensability’ 
that have been effectively employed and well-tested in the contexts of privative clause 
interpretation,185 jurisdictional fact identification,186 procedural error assessment,187 and 
                                                 
174
  (2010) 239 CLR 531, [68]ff. 
175
  Cf eg Mark Aronson, ‘Jurisdictional Error Without the Tears’ in Matthew Groves and HP Lee (eds), Australian 
Administrative Law: Fundamentals, Principles and Doctrines (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 330, 333; 
Chris Finn, ‘Constitutionalising Supervisory Review at State Level: The End of Hickman?’ (2010) 21 Public Law 
Review 92.  
176
  See eg Chris Finn, ‘Constitutionalising Supervisory Review at State Level: The End of Hickman?’ (2010) 21 
Public Law Review 92. 
177
  See eg Leighton McDonald, ‘The Entrenched Minimum Provision of Judicial Review and the Rule of Law’ 
(2010) 21 Public Law Review 14. 
178
  See eg the discussion in NAIS v Minister for Immigration and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 470, [159] 
(Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
179
  Chief Justice Spigelman, ‘Integrity and Privative Clauses’ (The Third Lecture in the 2004 National Lecture 
Series for the Australian Institute of Administrative Law, 2 September 2004, Brisbane).  
180
  Benjamin O’Donnell, ‘Jurisdictional Error, Invalidity and the Role of Injunction in s 75(v) of the Australian 
Constitution’ (2007) 28 Australian Bar Review 291. 
181
  Chief Justice Spigelman, ‘Integrity and Privative Clauses’ (The Third Lecture in the 2004 National Lecture 
Series for the Australian Institute of Administrative Law, 2 September 2004, Brisbane); Justice J Gilmour, ‘Kirk: 
Newton’s Apple Fell’ (2010 Conference of the Samuel Griffith Society, Perth, 29 August 2004) 13. 
182
  Cf eg Chief Justice Spigelman, ‘The Centrality of Jurisdictional Error’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 77, 84.  As 
to the possibility that ‘jurisdictional error’ may have different meanings for different purposes (or at least a 
different meaning in the context of High Court review), see eg Mark Aronson, ‘Jurisdictional Error Without the 
Tears’ in Matthew Groves and HP Lee (eds), Australian Administrative Law: Fundamentals, Principles and 
Doctrines (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 330, 333ff; Robin Creyke and John McMillan, Control of 
Government Action: Text, Cases & Commentary (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2
nd
 ed, 2009) 1063ff. 
183
  Cf the emphasis in NAIS v Minister for Immigration and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 470, [71]ff (Kirby J). 
184
  Note in this regard Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIZO (2009) 238 CLR 627 (French CJ, 
Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ) – particularly the use there of the term ‘inviolable’ in a simple 
procedural error case, interchangeably it seems with the term ‘imperative’ (see [24], [36]). 
185
  See Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476. 
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indeed statutory ‘no evidence’ standards.188  However for present purposes, the concept 
underlying these notions must be extracted from some extant confusion and polished a 
little.  
 
The faint and underexplored assumption,189 in some quarters, appears to have been that 
within the amorphous notion of ‘jurisdictional error’ there were two subsets of error 
defined by the ‘inviolable conditions’-type formula and the Hickman provisos (possibly 
overlapping, or perhaps one subsuming the other).  There is of course a broader 
category off screen; legal error (jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional), which is itself a 
subset of ‘error’ writ large.  Administrative lawyers spend many hours immersed in 
exploration of the various boundaries and intersections.  Under a deliberate and specific 
parliamentary intention-based approach to jurisdictional error, with the notion of 
‘essentiality’ or ‘inviolability’ adopted as the critical measure, the internal diagrammatic 
abstraction is reduced to a category of jurisdictional error coincident with breaches of 
inviolable limits and a fading inner subset defined by the old Hickman provisos.190  Of 
course the coalescence of ‘inviolability’ and jurisdiction is necessitated to some extent by 
the constitutional developments ushered in by Plaintiff S157 and Kirk: the notion that 
there is a category of jurisdictional error that does not amount to a breach of an 
inviolable condition and hence can be protected by a privative clause is no longer 
sustainable.191   
 
Within this simplified paradigm, the established Craig categories of jurisdictional error (to 
the extent that their meaning is settled) could obviously carry presumptions into the 
process of assessment, as would of course fraud192 or a breach of natural justice193 on 
the basis of their historical pedigree.  However, on this approach the Craig formulas are 
at the very least controlled (ie clarified, extended and confined as necessary) by the 
more statute-specific formula.  The established categories of legal error are therefore 
ultimately all dealt with in a similar manner, but with the assessment in each case 
graduated appropriately according to the specific legislative context and the identity of 
the decision maker.  It should be pointed out at this juncture that beyond natural justice 
and fraud (and perhaps bad faith and unreasonableness194), it is difficult to identify other 
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errors from the established grounds for which it would be hard to discern some statutory 
intention as to their essentiality.  And of course the essentiality focus readily 
accommodates the identification of complete absences of jurisdiction and failures to 
exercise jurisdiction.  The challenges of rationalising attacks on non-statutory powers 
remain, however the presumptions attending natural justice and fraud etc are a solid 
starting point for identifying jurisdictional error in that context.  Finally here, it must also 
ultimately be acknowledged that what was traditionally termed ‘narrow’ or ‘threshold’ 
jurisdictional error, and indeed the traditional Hickman errors themselves, may well be 
beyond salvage by any reconciliation and finding of inessentiality owing to inherent 
contrariety.195   
 
So how, precisely, does the deliberate statutory essentiality framework operate in the 
intractably difficult privative clause context?  Such clauses are of course still to be read 
down where possible, as an initial196 or component197 step, by reference to traditional 
textual confinement principles and (where applicable) constitutional considerations.  Any 
relevant remaining conflict in the statutory provisions must then be ‘reconciled’ (or further 
reconciled).  Where the reading down is, as so often has been the case, to exclude 
‘jurisdictional error’ from the privative clause’s protection, the focus obviously then turns 
to the notion of jurisdictional error (which will be unprotected) and its identification in the 
relevant case.  Externalists at this point may stop and reach for the Craig categories or 
established natural justice assumptions,198 and these obviously may carry some weight 
here, however under the more organised ‘essentiality’ approach the focus ultimately 
remains on the specific legislative intention as to the significance and consequences of 
the error in question.199   
 
A privative clause may of course reach beyond what can be easily read down, for 
example via popular contemporary drafting strategies such as extending protection to 
‘purported decisions’.  The High Court has cast some doubt on the potential of such 
simply-expressed extensions (just on basic interpretative principles), suggesting that the 
word ‘purported’ may add little as privative clauses only ever operate on decisions that 
are infirm in some respect.200  However, these (pre-Kirk) comments would seem to paper 
over well-established understandings of the term ‘decision’ and its interplay with 
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error.201 And in any event, a legislature can of course 
be more explicit about its purpose in extending privative clause protection to ‘purported’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
statutory power (silent on the issue of unreasonableness) so that it is an essential condition of the exercise of 
the power that it be exercised reasonably: Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510, [116]; Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611, [123] (Crennan and Bell JJ).  Cf also Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 83 ALJR 1123, [15] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel 
and Bell JJ) – and the earlier comments cited there. 
195
  Cf Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex Parte Applicants S134/2002 (2003) 
211 CLR 441, [77]ff (Gaudron and Kirby JJ); cf Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs 
v SGLB (2004) 78 ALJR 992. 
196
  Cf Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, [60], [70] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby 
and Hayne JJ); Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, [101]ff (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).  
197
  Cf Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, [19] (Gleeson CJ). 
198
  See particularly Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, [40]ff, [59] (Gaudron and Gummow JJ), [142] (Kirby J), [169] (Hayne 
J); and see also Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, [25] (Gleeson CJ), [83] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, 
Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
199
  See again, for example, Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 31ff (Gleeson CJ). 
200
  Batterham v QSR Ltd (2006) 225 CLR 237, [26] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Crennan JJ).  
201
  More recently in the State context, the High Court appears to prefer meeting such drafting techniques simply 
with the constitutional implications of the decision in Kirk: see eg Totani (2010) 85 ALJR 19, [26]ff (French CJ); 
Wainohu (2011) 85 ALJR 746, eg [15] (French CJ and Kiefel J).   
 25 
decisions.202  Yet it is not so easy to put aside the contemporary constitutional difficulty 
with such clauses (extended to the state level via Kirk): privative clauses cannot protect 
jurisdictional error from review by the High Court or the state Supreme Courts.  
However, as may by this point be obvious, the methodology identified in this article may 
yet return some life to such drafting techniques given its emphasis on the post hoc 
nature of jurisdictional error and the need for a true reconciliation of all statutory terms in 
its identification.  It is tempting to still pre-emptively dismiss such clauses (at least in the 
context of High Court and Supreme Court review) on the basis of their intention at face 
value to subvert the constitutional guarantee of supervisory jurisdiction.203  However, that 
would appear to miss a step if it is accepted that all legislative provisions have a role in 
defining relevant authority.   
 
A suitable approach to avoid some of the contradiction and circularity here may take the 
following form.  First, the ‘purported decision’ clause can be interpreted (quite naturally) 
as seeking to refer to any supposed decision.  Then on that basis, and resisting 
constitutional pre-emption, the clause may play (depending on particular context) its 
potentially larger role in the statutory reconciliation.  Errors ultimately considered to be in 
breach of limits still identified as essential or inviolable (thus properly identified as 
‘jurisdictional errors’) are not protected by the clause.  The ‘purported decision’ extension 
thus influences, but does not follow, the definition of jurisdictional error in the particular 
circumstances.  Allowing it to so follow would see this drafting mechanism double-
dipping in its impact – and of course often it could not follow and protect the defined 
jurisdictional errors for constitutional reasons.  It might be added here that any quicker 
constitutional pre-emption of such clauses, in the context of High Court and Supreme 
Court review, runs the risk of again leaving the Federal Court behind to some extent.     
 
The broader implications of a clarification 
 
A focused statutory ‘essentiality’ approach to jurisdictional error would carry several 
important implications.  First, the long suffering privative clause would be given a more 
legitimate and consistent role, for under this approach it is appropriate to factor in any 
privative clause in a reconciliation of statutory contradiction and hence in the 
identification of essential requirements.  Correlatively, parliaments would not be so 
stripped of influence irrespective of potentially sound reasons for certain decisions to be 
final and/or exclusively handled by specialist bodies204 (and in appropriate circumstances 
such reasons could be relevant to an assessment of relevant parliamentary intention on 
particular errors205).  It must be noted again here that Plaintiff S157 expressly rejected 
the idea206 that a privative clause simply expanded executive authority out to the limits 
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drawn in the Hickman provisos,207 however it seems clear, given the Court’s other 
comments in the case, that its real objection to the Hickman expansion argument was 
the automatic and unexaminable nature of its proposed result. 
 
Secondly, a fully developed essentiality approach to jurisdictional error would allow 
administrative law to complete the process begun by constitutional law – particularly in 
the uncertain context of the Federal Court’s jurisdiction.  Even without the constitutional 
overlay, review jurisdiction over jurisdictional error would effectively be guaranteed as a 
consequence of the process of statutory assessment and reconciliation.  The 
identification of essential or inviolable limits (and hence reviewable errors) by a 
reconciliation of the internal statutory contradiction arising from a privative clause would 
necessarily reveal and coincide with what would properly be classified as ‘jurisdictional 
error’ in the specific legislative context.  The Federal Court is thus maneuvered into line 
with the constitutionally favoured High Court and state Supreme Courts.  Administrative 
law’s own ‘gravitational pull’ will have struck in the federal orchard. 
 
Thirdly, under this framework the constitutional protection accorded to the supervisory 
jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Courts is supported by a more coherent 
and more responsive administrative law foundation.  It is difficult to point to another 
constitutional protection that depends upon a principle for which commentators and 
judges so readily concede208 there is no clear test.   
 
It might be argued that the focused ‘essentiality’ methodology, by aligning the definition 
of jurisdictional error more closely with specific legislative terms and purpose, too readily 
cedes the ostensible certainty that was hard-won in Plaintiff S157 and Kirk.    However, 
uncertainty has always been present in the very notion of jurisdictional error, and despite 
the superficial simplicity of the result in those decisions, the Court’s discussions indicate 
that we have in fact clearly reached the point of admitting that uncertainty.  If we so 
accept that ‘jurisdictional error’ is a flexible, functional and post hoc concept, what 
methodology could be more appropriate than a parliamentary intention focus? 209  If there 
are to be externally constructed incursions into this focus, then some rationalisation and 
justification of why different classes of errors are treated differently is sorely needed.  
This is particularly important when the disregard of clear parliamentary intention, 
including that expressed in privative clauses, may only press parliaments into other 
attempts at executive government protection in relevant situations – eg by less obvious 
limitations on review avenues and the conferral of artificially undefined discretions, all 
contrary to good government. 
 
One final theoretical implication of the essentiality approach is that the entrenchment of 
jurisdictional error review is already secured to some extent by administrative law’s own 
machinations.  Administrative law, via statutory reconciliation, itself achieves the 
protection of jurisdictional error supervision in the face of a privative clause (including in 
the Federal Court).  This is a potentially very useful by-product of the statute specific 
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focus, even beyond the Federal Court context, as we find here a blue collar shoring up 
of what some respected commentators see to be Kirk’s over-reliance upon specific 
constitutional references.210  
 
Irrespective of this potential administrative law backfilling, the importance of the 
constitutional principles at play - one step in the progressive Chapter III march - must not 
be understated.  They may prove to be the prompt for the administrative law clarification 
advocated in this article.  They now of course underwrite the continued existence of 
avenues of judicial review, providing structural protection where administrative law 
ceases.  They also play a key role in the initial textual interpretation of a privative clause, 
contributing to the force of traditional reading down techniques.  And they would seem to 
ensure that in relevant cases courts will seek jurisdictional boundaries, reinforcing 
administrative law’s sometimes eccentric wanderings against attempts to prevent such 
inquiries.211  Moreover, while administrative law currently provides the essential content 
of the critical notion of ‘jurisdictional error’ (by whatever means), the new constitutional 
dimension - which draws upon some powerfully organic ‘rule of law’ conceptions and a 
conspicuous antipathy towards untouchable 'islands of power' - may not remain silent in 
future refinement of the concept.  Constitutional and administrative law are now keen 
collaborators in this field, and certainly the notion of ‘essentiality’ has space for some 
constitutional infusion.   
 
Conclusion 
 
To return now from the intricacies of ‘jurisdictional error’, still the darkest corner of 
Australian administrative law, it is clear that the convergence of administrative and 
constitutional law principle in the Kirk decision brings us to an important and interesting 
point in Australian public law development.  As Chief Justice Spigelman’s gravity 
analogy suggests, the meeting was not by chance.  The federal precedent of Plaintiff 
S157, together with the recent busyness of constitutional law in identifying the core 
characteristics of courts and/or chasing off threats to their ‘institutional integrity’, 
inevitably led the High Court to the critical supervisory role of the state Supreme Courts.  
For many legal observers this is a role that affirms the rule of law in its simplest 
incarnation; the notion that governments must have legal warrant for what they do.212  By 
the same token, there was significant independent force in administrative law’s aversion 
to attempted statutory ouster of jurisdictional error review, and it was perhaps inevitable 
that the appeal of a constitutional absolute would reach the state level.         
 
Whether the convergence was a product of gravity or independent forces, the 
implications are highly significant.  This article has endeavoured to draw together the 
threads of the important constitutional law developments at play here, examining the 
evolution of the protected constitutional personality of state courts and the organising 
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principle for this found in the integrated court structure engrained by Chapter III of the 
Constitution.  This article has argued that Kirk represents one stop, but an important 
one, on the Chapter III journey that began in Kable.  Ultimately, the integration of the 
judicature becomes the constitutional rationale for a progressive elucidation of ‘minimum’ 
curial content, which in turn brings about a de facto separation of powers at the state 
level to curb legislative encroachments on the role of the state judicature.  
 
Beyond the constitutional law importance of Kirk, and its contribution in a slow-starting 
but now quickening constitutional epic, the practical administrative law implications are 
very significant.  Practitioners and academics, having long struggled with the 
complexities and contradictions of privative clause interpretation, were briefly rendered 
quiet by the simplicity and clarity of the High Court’s critical determination that Supreme 
Court supervision of jurisdictional error is constitutionally entrenched.  The important 
affirmations of Plaintiff S157 had thus been replicated at state level, and the implications 
for executive decision-making and administrative law practice were profound.  However, 
important questions remain.  Most significantly, given the growing significance of the 
notion of ‘jurisdictional error’ in Australia, are we now any closer in the High Court 
precedent to a settled position on its meaning?   
 
The Kirk decision’s own contribution on the notion of jurisdictional error has been 
somewhat neglected in the academic and public focus on the case’s constitutional 
significance.  However, the case marks an interesting return by the High Court to the 
administrative law puzzle.  At the very least, with its clear acknowledgement of the 
uncertainty of jurisdictional error and the incompleteness of the Craig formulas, the 
decision has opened space for a renewed debate.  More importantly however, it 
provides a new point of access to a subtle methodological divide in the Australian 
thinking on this issue – a divide between what have been termed here the external and 
internal approaches.  The latter, on one reading offered up by the Plaintiff S157 decision, 
is somewhat out of fashion.  However, it in fact provides a solution to many of the 
inconsistencies and uncertainties attending the jurisdictional error assessment, which 
has for many years often hovered somewhere between judicial instinct213 and the 
awkward and ambiguous predictive formulas of Craig.214  An explicit, internal statutory 
intention focus – largely freed from the distractions of the Craig formulas – would 
produce a more coherent and flexible approach that is more respectful of legislative 
purpose and more consistent with surrounding administrative law methodology.  It 
would, in short, produce a more palatable uncertainty.  A tested measure of 
parliamentary intention for these purposes, already effectively applied in specific 
administrative law contexts, is the notion of ‘essentiality’ or ‘inviolability’.  As explained 
above, such a methodology could incidentally work some reform to the awkward judicial 
exile of privative clauses and the parliamentary purposes behind them.  It could correct 
an equation that appears to have left the Federal Court, a significant contributor to 
Australian judicial review, outside looking in.  And it could provide some much needed 
conceptual strength and clarity to the newest Australian constitutional guarantee. 
 
From the elegant public law convergence in the Kirk decision, Australian commentators 
and practitioners will now return to their respective trails – perhaps buoyed somewhat by 
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a renewed faith in the practical potential of constitutional guarantees, and by the 
emerging simplicity in privative clause operation.  However, on the mysteries of 
jurisdictional error the promise is perhaps at best a promise of greater candour.  On this 
issue, there are ‘miles to go before [we] sleep’.215  
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